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INDIA SHOULD be seriously worried about the the direction in which US/ NATO policy is headed in Afghanistan. The willingness of the West to make a political deal with the Taliban as part of their exit strategy in Afghanistan should be the core concern. The exact import of US statements over the months on the need for a political solution in Afghanistan, as a purely military solution will not work, has become clearer now. President Obama himself, in his two speeches last year outlining USs “ Af- Pak” policy, focussed on the Al Qaida as the principal threat to US security and tellingly omitted any reference to the Taliban. This suggested caution in not closing the doors on a potential political settlement with the Taliban even as the US fought them on the ground in Afghanistan and launched drone attacks against its cadres on Pakistani territory. The two pronged policy seems to have been to contain and even roll back the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and from a position of relative strength negotiate a political deal with its leadership. Which is why the US has not really coerced Pakistan into acting against the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani and Hekmatyar networks. This strategy has suited Pakistan too as the Afghan Taliban are its strategic asset for restoring its influence in Afghanistan post a settlement there. Policy With the public support for the war in Afghanistan waning in the US, the state of its economy making the cost of the war increasingly burdensome and its electoral calendar imposing a short deadline for finding a “ solution”, the Obama Administrations policy in Afghanistan has wavered. The unwillingness of key European countries to expend more human and material resources there has added to the confusion. The most disquieting upshot of these pressures is the western acceptance of the policy of reintegration and reconciliation with the Taliban. In his November 19, 2009 speech on taking over the Presidency after the elections, President Karzai singled out reconciliation as one of the key priorities of his government. In December 2009 NATO issued a statement underlining that reconciliation and reintegration represent an essential component of a successful ISAF campaign to overcome the insurgency. Reintegration, it explained, would mean efforts at the tactical and operational levels to persuade low- level fighters, commanders and shadow governors to lay down their arms and to assimilate peacefully into Afghan society. Reconciliation refers to high level strategic dialogue with senior leaders of the insurgent groups designed to terminate their armed campaign against the Afghan people and their government. Both processes are to be Afghan led. The 26 January, 2010 Istanbul meeting, from which India was excluded at Pakistans insistence, extended support for this Afghan driven national process of reconciliation and reintegration. The 28 January 2010 London Conference, to which India was invited but its views disregarded, endorsed the Istanbul meetings support for reconciliation and reintegration and “ welcomed the plans of the Government of Afghanistan to offer an honourable place in society to those willing to renounce violence, participate in the free and open society and respect the principles that are enshrined in the Afghan constitution, cut ties with the Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and pursue their political goals peacefully” President Karzai has been advocating overtures to the Taliban since 2004, roping in Saudi Arabia to act as a bridge with the Taliban, but without success. His strategy may have been to enlarge his Pashtun base and obtain more political elbow room vis a vis the Americans, but can he realistically do this in the face of his failure to mobilise Pashtun support behind him all these years and emerge as a veritable Pashtun leader? Having emerged weaker from the last Presidential election, with the West accusing him of election fraud and, failing to organise a second round, reluctantly accepting the election result, but not without putting him on notice that his performance would be monitored for better governance and serious anti- corruption measures etc, what extra cards does he have in his hands? Why should the Taliban accept the leadership of a Karzai whose Pashtun support base remains feeble and whose western support base has slipped badly? Why should they be willing to share power with him? Deadline What incentives will those opposing the Karzai government have to peacefully integrate themselves into Afghan society? Can better governance be provided by the Karzai regime by July 2011, the date when the US intends to draw down its forces in Afghanistan? Can economic development reach all corners of Afghanistan? Can employment opportunities be created in this short period? Where will the huge resources required for this come from? A Reintegration Fund of $ 500 million, with committed funds amounting to $ 140 million only, is clearly insufficient. Would it be physically possible to create a well armed and trained Afghan force of 171.600 by July 2011, capable of providing assured protection for those throwing in their lot with the government against any Taliban reprisals? Good governance, economic development and building up of capable and effective armed forces and police is a work of many years not a mere 18 months. Pakistan While the emphasis is on the reconciliation process being Afghan led, it is Saudi Arabia that is being invited to intercede with the Taliban. The mediatory role is being given to the most conservative Islamic country, one of the three that recognised the odious Taliban regime. Would the Saudis impress on the Taliban to respect modern values, democracy, womens rights, gender equality and abandon sharia- based punishment practices? Given the close nexus between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, is it conceivable that Saudi Arabia will not closely consult Pakistan and indeed help advance its interests in Afghanistan? In fact Pakistan will automatically get a role in these parleys with the Taliban as these groups are located on its territory and have close links with the ISI. An unstated aspect of this outreach to the Taliban leadership is an acknowledgement by the West of Pakistans critical role in this exercise, and hence, as General Kiyani says, of the need to harmonise the interests of Pakistan and the West in Afghanistan, which would include Pakistan acquiring a form of strategic depth there. Why President Karzai feels he can survive a political deal with the Taliban is unclear. The West has no particular attachment to him. It would have lived with an earlier Taliban regime in Afghanistan had it agreed to abandon the Al Qaeda. It would be willing to live with another post- Karzai Taliban like regime so long as it is not anti- West and it cuts off links with Al Qaeda, a point that the Saudis too will press on the Taliban leadership. All this shows once again that the fight against terrorism remains is not a collective one despite the rhetoric. The Taliban Foreign Minister, Vakil Ahmad Muttawakil, complicit with the IC- 814 hijackers, has been removed from the UNSC terror list without regard to Indian sensitivities. The conditions for the spread of an extremist version of Islam in our region are being created by this willingness to reconcile with the Taliban, with long term consequences for Indias security. The writer is a former Foreign Secretary( sibalkanwal@ gmail. com) SMS YOUR OPINION by typing MTO < space> your full name< space> your opinion and sending it to 52424 |